these treaties. Interestingly, a few states appear to have both many false positives and false negatives, including the United States, Switzerland and Cuba. This suggests that the model is relatively weak at predicting the treaty ratification behavior of these states, i.e., that these states tend to be the most idiosyncratic in terms of treaty ratification.
Three standardized measures of fit have been developed to compare results using multidimensional scaling methods (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 2005) . The first is the percentage of choices included in the underlying data that are correctly classified by the model. This measure gives an overall sense of how well treaty ratifications fit each of the dimensions and provides an indication of the extent to which the second dimension is significant relative to the first. One limitation of this measure, however, is that it does not take into account the underlying distribution of 1s and 0s in the data, which is likely to be uneven. This problem is addressed by a second measure, the aggregate proportional reduction in error (APRE), which provides the percentage reduction in classification errors provided by W-NOMINATE relative to a model that assumes all states ratify the same treaties as the majority of states. The APRE is calculated by dividing (1) the sum of all minority choices subtracted by classification errors; by (2) the sum of minority choices. A highly effective method of determining the effect of adding dimensions to the model involves subtracting the APRE for a one-dimensional model from the APRE for a two-dimensional model, which controls for the size of the majority and provides a measure of the net benefit of adding the second dimension. Finally, the geometric mean probability (GMP) reflects how well each state's actual choices reflect those predicted by the model. The GMP is calculated by taking the exponential of the average log-likelihood of observed decisions. Table 5 provides the measures of fit for several years of the treaty data. For comparison, Table 5 also provides comparable measures provided by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for the U.S. House of Representatives; Hix, Noury and Rolan (2006) for the European Parliament; and Voeten (2000) for the UNGA. The first dimension appears to explain about 82% of the variance in the treaty data, whereas the second dimension 3 explains only an additional 2%. Most importantly, this suggests the first dimension is meaningful and predicts treaty commitment to a significant extent. This also suggests that the second dimension is not especially significant and minor differences in states' locations along that dimension may not be particularly meaningful. The measures of fit are comparable to those of the other data, especially the Congressional data. It is notable that the APRE2-APRE1 statistic is significantly larger for the treaty data than for the U.S.
House and UNGA, which means that adding the second dimension to the model does more to improve fit with respect to the treaty commitment data. Nonetheless, the decline in this statistic over time suggests the second dimension has become less important. which further suggests the dimension is more likely to be one of economic interests than factors such as regime type, region and civilization, along which the two powers clearly differ. Finally, the fact that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are consistently on the same side of the first dimension weighs against the Cold War being a key determinant of treaty commitment preferences. Indeed, the lack of significant movement by the great powers after the end of the Cold War suggests this change in the structure of international relations did not have a significant impact on treaty commitment preferences.
C. Additional Monadic Analysis of W-NOMINATE Space
Other states have also moved significantly in the treaty preference space. Figure 7 shows the movement over time of the four states that have moved the furthest along the first dimension: Uruguay, Paraguay, Mali and South Korea. These cases may be especially informative as to the substantive meaning of the coordinates. All of these moved in the same direction, although at different times. Analyzing these periods in these states'
histories may help to explain the first dimension. South Korea's major movement occurred 
C.2 Analysis of Normal Vectors
In this section, I interpret the treaty preference space by using normal vector analysis. Normal vectors in the preference space that are close to parallel to the dimensional axes may reveal the meanings of those dimensions. The first step is to estimate the following OLS model:
where Y is a vector of country-year data (e.g., trade, GDP), X 1 is the vector of first-dimension W-NOMINATE coordinates and X 2 is the vector of second-dimension W-NOMINATE coordinates. The coordinates (x, y) of the normal vector are obtained using the following equations:
The normal vector is plotted along the line that connects the points (x, y) and (−x, −y). I estimate the normal vectors for several variables. I use the same data sources described in the paper. I use the measures of Affinity toward the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
developed by Gartzke (2006) as indicators of preference similarity to the U.S. and U.S.S.R. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 The baseline region is America. The baseline civilization includes the states coded by Huntington as "other". 
C.3 Dyadic Regression Results
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E. Analysis of Second Dimension
This section analyzes the second dimension of the treaty commitment preference space. Figure 10 Figure 10 shows the fits of competing OLS models of the second-dimension coordinates. In the 1960s, the second dimension is highly correlated with trade, although this correlation declines in the early 1970s, which is also the era in which the fit of trade with the first dimension improves. Civilization has the best fit with the second dimension.
This can be difficult to interpret because it is a categorical variable, but based on the plots in Figure 6 , it seems that Western, Orthodox and Latin American states tend to be on one end of this dimension, whereas African, Sinic, Islamic and Buddhist states are mostly on the other end. This suggests that the meaning of the second dimension, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, may be related to cultural issues. As with the first dimension, capabilities are a poor predictor of treaty commitment preferences. Table 11 shows the results of OLS models of the second-dimension coordinates with all variables included. The two variables most consistently significant are the Western and Latin-American civilizations. This is consistent with the visual finding that these states tend to cluster on one end of the preference space along the second dimension.
Interestingly, Voeten (2000) finds that membership in these civilizations is significantly correlated with the first dimension of UNGA voting in the 1990s, whereas with respect to treaty preferences these variables are only significant for the second dimension. This indicates that the determinants of UNGA voting preferences differ substantially from those of treaty commitment preferences. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 The baseline region is America. The baseline civilization includes the states coded by Huntington as "other".
